Telephone conversations, while these days often taking place on mobile phones in public places, have often been considered to be, by many people, private conversations. Even when one person (or a whole crowded room) can hear half of a conversation, it’s not always readily apparent what the entire discourse is about.
This false sense of security has been the focal point of many a Hollywood film, often with the police, the government, or even the villains listening in and recording phone conversations through various methods. Traditional telephones are, after all, very easy to listen in on, as the technology behind them is exceedingly simple.
When cordless and early mobile phones became popular, this sort of listening in became even easier. Anyone with $30USD and a nearby Radio Shack could buy all the equipment he needed to hear the intimate conversations of his neighbors. A famous incident involving someone listening into phone conversations was one in which Prince Charles was overheard telling his mistress at the time, Camilla Parker Bowles, that he wished to be her tampon. The ease with which the conversation was overheard helped more people become aware of the inherent insecurity in phone conversations.
Since then, many mobile phones have gone digital and implemented several methods to help protect their users’ conversations from anyone trying to listen in. Conversations on mobile networks are interleaved and portions of the conversation are carried out on different, random channels to make it difficult to intercept any whole conversation as it flies through the air. They use this method of encryption to secure their calls.
There is an inherent flaw in these methods work, however: All data is disassembled and reassembled via a ‘trusted’ party (in this case, the mobile phone company). This is for the dual purpose of centralised management and ease of governmental wire-tapping. The phone company, then, is the ‘man in the middle’ who facilitates the security of the conversation. At any time, the phone company could choose to share the secure conversation with another third party, and in cases of police wire tapping, that’s exactly what’s done.
Enter into the equation VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). VoIP conversations, by their very nature, are more difficult for the layman to intercept, as they’re sent over the Internet as opposed to floating through the air or winding along wires as raw, unencrypted audio signals. It takes a little more expertise to tap into an Internet conversation and convert the data back into audio, but there is plenty of computer software available that takes the expertise out of the equation, allowing anyone to tap in and record if he can somehow find his way into the data stream. With Wi-Fi networks, this is quite easy, as all the data is just bouncing through the air.
It makes reasonable sense that VoIP, with its modern, technological origin, would have some sort of encryption built in that would make listening in on conversations more difficult, but in truth, encryption is still not always readily available in the VoIP world.
In VoIP, there are several issues to worry about. For one, if you’re using a VoIP phone to talk to a regular old landline or mobile phone, you run into the inherent limitations of both the traditional telephone network or the mobile phone network (as mentioned above). For another, while there are encryption methods available for VoIP calls, not many phones readily support them, and they each have their own flaws as well.
The major method of encrypting a VoIP conversation is called SRTP. The audio part of a VoIP phone call gets passed through the Internet using something called the RTP protocol (Real Time Transport). The S in SRTP stands for ’secure.’ SRTP works a lot like a secure web page works. A centralised authority hands the digital equivalent of a code word out to each phone, allowing the phones to encrypt their conversations back and forth. The centralised authority, often the VoIP provider itself, is considered to be a ‘trusted’ authority. However, there is still concern that such an authority could allow back-door access to a conversation to other people — governments or other authorities. It’s also possible that a particularly unscrupulous trusted authority could faciliate access to anyone it chooses.
This brings us to a different kind of encryption, ZRTP. ZRTP, created by Phil Zimmermann, the man who almost went to jail in the US for writing and openly sharing the high-powered encryption software, PGP, is a method of handling VoIP encryption without relying on a trusted authority in the middle. The phones themselves negotiate a secret code pair and share them with each other in a secure way, creating an encrypted conversation between the two phones. ZRTP uses a method of encryption called Diffie-Hellmann, which uses a public and private key encryption scheme. Each phone has a private code key and a public code key, and the only key ever shared is the public key. One end uses the public key to encrypt the conversation, and the other end uses its private key (unknown to anyone but him) to decrypt the conversation.
Diffie-Hellmann is an incredibly secure method of communication, that suffers only one weakness — a ‘man in the middle’ attack. The idea of a man in the middle attack is that someone COULD be in the middle of a conversation, intercepting all the calls and all the keys. He passes out his own keys to both sides, pretending to be the other person. He is able to decrypt and re-encrypt the conversation in both directions, thereby listening in to the entire conversation.
A man in the middle attack is a difficult thing to accomplish, but it’s possible, so one usually takes precautions such as sharing code words decided in advance, to ensure that the person you’re talking to is REALLY the person you expect to talk to on the other end.
The ZRTP code is freely available for anyone to use in his own software, and Zimmermann has also created ZFone, a program which encrypts the conversations from most popular VoIP softphones.
Unfortunately, VoIP hardware phones and PBX switches have yet to implement any form of ZRTP, so in order to use this newer, more secure communication method, you’re limited to VoIP to VoIP calls (remember, the limitations of traditional and mobile phone networks don’t allow for the same type of encryption yet) between other ZFone users on compatible VoIP networks (IdeaSIP, FWD, Gizmo Project, etc.)
There is simple no such thing as an unbreakable method of securing a phone call. Given enough time and enough resources, any encryption scheme could be broken. Strong encryption, however, is often impractical to break, and it’s usually much easier to rely on people and their misunderstanding of the privacy of their calls as the weak link in any security scheme. While, in this modern age of VoIP, one can still have a reasonably private conversation, secure in the knowledge that his intimate discussions won’t make it to the media, the best way to keep a secret is, and always will be, never to tell it to anyone.